We construct a two-country North-South product cycle model of trade with endogenous growth and trade barriers. We remove the scale effects on growth by incorporating rent protection activities by Northern incumbents. We examine the effects of two forms of globalization -an expansion of the relative size of the South and unilateral trade liberalization by either country. We find that the location of rent protection institutions and the sectoral trade structure determine whether or not globalization raises steady-state economic growth. We demonstrate that for accelerating worldwide economic growth, contrary to conventional wisdom, unilateral Northern trade liberalization is preferable to bilateral trade liberalization.
Referees' Appendix (not to be published)

Appendix R.1: The PEG Model
In order to verify whether the assumption of RPAs is crucial for the tariff-neutrality result of proposition 2, we replace this route of removing scale effects by the more conventional "permanenteffects-on-growth" (PEG) specification of rising R&D difficulty, which can be found, e.g., in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999a), Dinopoulos and Thompson (1996 , 2000 ), or Şener (2001 . In this formulation, R&D difficulty is tied to the exogenous (Northern) population size and is therefore independent of the Northern firm value. Formally, relative to our RPA formulation, the following changes: instead of (7), we have Solving (R.6) and (R.7) yields ( ) Again, tariff rates do not show up in these two steady-state equilibrium equations. Therefore, the fact that in the model with RPAs, changes in firm profits trigger proportional changes in RPAs is not responsible for the neutrality of tariff changes with respect to the steady-state industry-wide rates of innovation and imitation.
Comparing (R.6) and (R.7) with (25) and (26), respectively, reveals that the predictions on the effects of unilateral tariff rate changes in the PEG model on w LN and c N are the same as in the baseline RPA model. Furthermore, it is straightforward to see that increased Southern trade integration has also the same effects in the PEG model as in the baseline RPA model.
Appendix R.2: Asset Ownership Conditions Instead Of The BOT Condition
As an alternative to imposing the BOT condition (22), we can impose an asset market equilibrium condition to solve the system (25) -(31) in order to derive an additional equation for c N or c S , respectively. By this we can verify that it is not the chosen particular way to derive this additionally required equation which is driving our results from propositions 1 and 2.
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Since 
which, after using (23), (10), (19) and (21), can be rewritten as
Similarly, we derive the Southern per-capita consumption expenditures (including payments for the Northern import tariff)
which, after using (10), (19) and (21) n N V N + n S V S measures the valuation of worldwide assets, and φ is the share of assets owned by Southern consumers (i.e., opposite to the "balanced asset ownership" case, we allow for international cross ownership of firms). Again, solving the model under these assumptions and performing the same comparative static exercises as before yields exactly the same results in terms of ι, μ and n N as those stated in Proposition 1 and 2 before.
35
Hence, the bottom line is that allowing for unbalanced asset ownership does not change the steady-state results relative to balanced asset ownership, and more generally, whether we use a BOT 34 Contrary to the balanced-trade specification, the sign of dw LN /dη S and dw LN /dτ N becomes ambiguous. However, for sufficiently low tariff rates and sufficiently low consumer discount rate ρ − n, dw LN /dη S < 0 as before. dw LN /dτ S remains qualitatively the same as with balanced trade. 35 As for the effects on w LN , the same reservations as with balanced asset ownership apply.
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condition or an asset market equilibrium condition to solve our set of steady-state equilibrium equations does not matter for results in terms of ι, μ and n N at all.
Appendix R.3: Derivation of the Steady-State Utility Growth Rate
From equation (2) we can derive the common steady-state utility growth rate of both countries as follows: taking into account that only goods with the lowest quality-adjusted price are consumed, and considering the different goods pricing of Northern and Southern firms for both markets, respectively, we get
log log log 1 log log log 1
as the instantaneous utility of Northern consumers. Similarly, we get
log log log 1 1 log log log 1 In order to transform the household's optimization problem of maximizing (1) subject to (37) and (38) 
Since the households take the evolution of the innovation index j(ω,t) and the high-tech goods price p(ω,t) as given, the term 
and using the definition ( ) ( ) 
Appendix R.5: The Baseline Model With Only One Type of Northern Labor
This Appendix first shows that the central findings of our baseline model (Propositions 1 and 2 from section 3) are robust to the following change in the labor assignment. Instead of distinguishing between general-purpose and specialized workers in the North, we now assume only one type of (general-purpose) Northern labor that is perfectly mobile between all three activities, which are R&D, manufacturing and (global) RPAs. As before, there is only one type of Southern labor that
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can be employed in manufacturing of final goods or imitation, which are the only types of activities in the South. We then check for the robustness of our two Main Results as well.
We denote w LN as the Northern wage rate, while the Southern wage rate is still normalized to unity. Equation (7) for the total Northern firm's profits changes to
Equation (17) for the optimal RPA decision changes to
The Northern general-purpose labor market clearing (LABN) condition (18) becomes
and the free-entry in imitation (FEIM) condition (26) changes to
Dividing both sides of (R.27) by N N , using (21) and (22), we derive the LABN condition as:
where x ≡ X N /N N denotes the per-Northern-worker RPA. Dividing both sides of (20) by N S , using (21) and (22), we derive the LABS condition as:
Taking the ratio of (R.26) to (13) with D substituted from (10) and using (21) gives the relative
which captures the profitability of innovation with respect to RPA. A ι captures the relative resource requirement in R&D with respect to RPAs. Obviously, as A ι declines, the rate of innovation increases. This is also highlighted in Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2007) . Note that since the relative profitability is no longer tied to a relative wage, the link between innovation rate and the other parameters of the model vanishes. In particular, the rate of innovation is pinned down by the resource parameters in R&D and RPA. 36 The parameters λ and ρ do not play a role in the determination of ι.
The link between ι and the model's entire parameter set (with the exception of the tariff rates, as has been shown in the main text) is reestablished under two conditions that must be fulfilled jointly:
first, more than one factor of production is incorporated in either R&D or RPA, and second, there is some labor mobility between either manufacturing and R&D or between manufacturing and RPAs.
37
Using the definitions for and , and 
S a n a n w a n a n can be written as functions in x and μ only:
36 In Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2007) when one type of labor conducts all activities, the rate of population growth exerts no influence on the innovation rate. The reason is that they model R&D difficulty as a flow variable whereas we model it as a stock variable. In our model, higher population growth dilutes R&D difficulty per-capita and boosts steady-state innovation. 37 In the growth literature, is has become common practice to denote a growth model "(fully) endogenous" under two conditions: first, the growth rate is derived from the optimizing behavior of the economic agents of the model, and second, the growth rate can be affected by public policies. By contrast, a growth model is denoted "semi-endogenous" if its growth rate fulfills the first but not the second condition. In this sense, the growth rate that results from (R.32) is still fully endogenous since e.g. an R&D subsidy rate would reduce the relative resource requirement A ι in R&D with respect to RPAs.
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Analyzing the Jacobi matrix of the system (R.35) and (R.36) reveals that LABN is unambiguously upward sloping, while LABS is downward sloping for a sufficiently small households' net discount rate ρ − n and 2a ι > a μ (a sufficient but hardly necessary condition).
We immediately see that tariffs again do not enter (R.35) and (R.36), hence the tariff-neutrality result of Proposition 2 is still valid for this specification of the labor assignment. Appendix R.6 in 
ly. Equation (13) 
The RHS of (R.49) is decreasing in μ, and the LHS of (R.49) is increasing in μ and decreasing in η S , hence an increase in η S requires an increase in μ to restore LABS(μ, η S ) again. Differentiating (R.48) with respect to η S shows: where den and num refer to denominator and numerator of the RHS of (R.48), respectively. In order to check whether condition (R.50) is fulfilled, we apply the implicit function theorem to (R.49): Clear@μ, x, ηS, λ, dr, d, ρ, n, δ, γ, ai, aμ, τN, 2 ai x δ ∆ηS μ Iaμ n γ λ+ai Haμ dr δ+2 n γ λL+ai 2 δ λ Hdr+2 μLM Haμ Hn γ+ai dr δL+ai Hn γ λ+ai δ Hdr+λ μLLL ηS Hn γ+ai δ μL Iaμ 2 n 2 γ 2 λ+ai aμ n γ H1+λL Haμ dr δ+2 n γ λL+ai 3 δ Haμ dr δ+2 n γ λL Hdr+dr λ+4 λ μL+ai 4 δ 2 λ Idr 2 +4 dr μ+4 λ μ 2 M+ai 2 Iaμ 2 dr 2 δ 2 +4 n 2 γ 2 λ 2 +2 aμ n γ δ λ H3 dr+2 μLMM ∆ηS μ Iaμ n γ λ+ai Haμ dr δ+2 n γ λL+ai 2 δ λ Hdr+2 μLM Haμ Hn γ+ai dr δL+ai H2 n γ λ+ai δ Hdr+2 λ μLLL ηS Iaμ 2 n 2 γ 2 λ+ai aμ n γ H1+λL Haμ dr δ+2 n γ λL+ai 3 δ Haμ dr δ+2 n γ λL Hdr+dr λ+4 λ μL+ai 4 δ 2 λ Idr 2 +4 dr μ+4 λ μ 2 M+ai 2 Iaμ 2 dr 2 δ 2 +4 n 2 γ 2 λ 2 +2 aμ n γ δ λ H3 dr+2 μLMM λ Iaμ n γ + ai H2 n γ + aμ dr δL + ai 2 δ Hdr + 2 μLM Hai δ μ + n γ H1 + τNLL
Haμ Hn γ + ai dr δL + ai λ H2 n γ + ai δ Hdr + 2 μLLL Hn γ + ai δ μ H1 + τSLL
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COMPARATIVE STATICS FOR τS;
In[140]:= BτS = 8gradf@FLABN@x, μ, dr, ηS, λ, ρ, n, δ, γ, ai, aμ, τN, τSD , 8τS<D, gradf@FLABS@x, μ, dr, ηS, λ, ρ, n, δ, γ, ai, aμ, τN, τSD , 8τS<D< 
COMPARATIVE STATICS FOR τN;
In[152]:= BτN = 8gradf@FLABN@x, μ, dr, ηS, λ, ρ, n, δ, γ, ai, aμ, τN, τSD , 8τN<D, gradf@FLABS@x, μ, dr, ηS, λ, ρ, n, δ, γ, ai, aμ, τN, τSD , 8τN<D<
In [ where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 and γ > 0. Equation (7) for the total Northern firm's profits changes to workers. Taking the ratio of (R.53) to (13) with D substituted from (10) and using (21) gives the 38 A version of our model with two types of Northern labor and a Cobb-Douglas technology for RPAs in the North, and an additional Southern low-tech sector is no longer analytically tractable. This is why our Proposition 3 and Main Result 2 cannot be checked analytically for this labor assignment.
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relative profitability condition
where A ι ≡ (a ι δ)/(nγ) again captures the relative resource requirement in R&D with respect to RPAs.
Obviously, the rate of innovation increases in the relative cost of RPAs with respect to R&D, i.e., the RHS of (R.56). Observe that we consider in the main text the special case β = 1, i.e. RPAs use only specialized labor. Analyzing the Jacobi matrix of the system (R.59) and (R.60) reveals that LABN is unambiguously upward sloping, while LABS is downward sloping for a sufficiently small households' net discount rate ρ − n, which corresponds to the condition (34) in our baseline model in the main text.
We immediately see that tariffs again do not enter (R.59) and (R.60), hence the tariff-neutrality result of Proposition 2 is still valid for this specification of the labor assignment. Appendix R. 
The LHS of (R.68) is rising in ι and declining in μ, hence LABN(ι, μ) is positively sloped in (ι, μ)-space. Since an increase in η S raises the LHS, a reduction of ι is required for any given μ to restore the Northern labor market equilibrium, hence the LABN curve shifts downward. Finally, the Southern labor market equilibrium condition is still given by (R.49), which we rewrite here for convenience: Comparing these two shifts show that depending on parameter values, the net effect on ι can indeed be positive or negative. Hence, part ii. of Main Result 1 is still valid. Given that contrary to Appendix R.5 an increase in η S not only increases μ but also changes ι (in ambiguous direction), the net effect on w LN (where this wage rate is still given in (R.48)) cannot be signed analytically, hence part i. of Main Result 1 cannot be checked analytically for this version of the model. 
